Journal
Prelude to invasion: covert operations before the re-occupation of
Northwest Borneo, 1944-45
Ooi Keat Gin
{1} In 1945 the task of retaking from the Japanese the former British
Borneo territories of Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo (Sabah) was
entrusted to the Australian Imperial Force (AIF). The 20th and 24th
Brigades of the 9th Division launched an amphibious offensive, codenamed
OBOE 6, with landings in the Brunei Bay area and Labuan Island in June.
The groundwork for OBOE 6 began several months prior to its execution.
In March 1945, members of the Australian Services Reconnaissance Department
(SRD) were dropped behind enemy lines in the Upper Baram and Trusan
valleys in Sarawak, and at Labuk Bay in North Borneo. The objective
of the SRD was to gather intelligence, survey the terrain, and organize
local resistance - in anticipation of the imminent AIF invasion. This
paper examines the activities of the SRD in preparing the stage for
the launch of OBOE 6, and evaluates the contribution of SRD covert operations
to the effective implementation of the invasion plans.
The war against Japan and the Borneo campaigns
{2} The island of Borneo, with its oilfields and strategic location
for the offensive against British Malaya and Dutch Java, was one of
the prime targets of Japan's military offensive of 1941-42. The Japanese
systematically and swiftly secured their objectives in Borneo during
the early months of their ‘push’ into the resource-rich Southern Area
(South-East Asia) following Pearl Harbor. The Miri and Seria oilfields
in Sarawak and Brunei respectively were captured without much fuss in
less than a fortnight of their initial landings off the north-west coast
of Borneo in mid-December 1941. Before the close of January 1942, the
Dutch oilfields at Tarakan and Balikpapan were under Japanese control.
By 1943 Bornean oil was contributing to the Japanese war machine.
{3} The later part of 1944, however, witnessed the increasing effectiveness
of the American navy in cutting off Japanese shipping lines between
the home islands and the Southern Area. Moreover, Allied bombing raids
were continuously carried out on oilfields and other strategic areas
of Borneo from Australia. As the American offensive gained ground in
the Philippines, the Japanese home islands increasingly lost their links
with sources of oil supply in Borneo.
{4} The island of Borneo came within the scope of operations of the
South-West Pacific Area (SWPA) under the command of the American general,
Douglas MacArthur.1 Despite its oilfields,
Borneo did not feature high on MacArthur's list of priorities. He was
obsessively determined to re-take the Philippines at all costs, arguing
that an American occupation would hastened the defeat of Japan through
cutting off the Japanese supply line from its Southern Area. More importantly,
MacArthur saw his return to the Philippines which he left hurriedly
in early 1942 for Australia as a means of restoring American
prestige and honour. It was an apparent case of political expediency
overriding military strategy.
{5} In order to facilitate his reconquest of the Philippines, MacArthur
struck a deal with the Dutch that he be given "complete authority
in the East Indies during any military operations". In return,
he promised to restore Dutch authority in their colonies as rapidly
as possible.2 Therefore, the recapture of
the Netherlands East Indies, particularly Java, became part of MacArthur’s
plans. The seizure of Borneo was to offer bases to launch his offensive
against Java. Furthermore MacArthur argued that the Bornean oilfields
would be denied the enemy and instead deployed to Allied advantage.
{6} Nonetheless MacArthur had no intention of committing American land
forces in the Borneo campaign. Instead, Australian troops would spearhead
the offensive there, with landings planned at Tarakan, Brunei Bay and
Labuan Island, and Balikpapan in that order. The Australian Army
had ample American naval and air support, and also from the Royal Australian
Air Force (RAAF), for amphibious operations. The 1st Australian Corps,
consisting of the 7th and 9th AIF Divisions under the command of Lieutenant
General Sir Leslie Morshead, was entrusted with the Borneo operations.
{7} The reconquest of Borneo was the second phase of the MONTCLAIR
operation which aimed at reoccupying the southern Philippines, British
North Borneo, and large areas of the Netherlands East Indies.3
Out of the planned six OBOE operations,4
three only were approved by the CCS and subsequently implemented in
mid-1945: OBOE 1 (Tarakan) was launched on 1 May; OBOE 6 (British North
Borneo) on 10 June; and OBOE 2 (Balikpapan) on 1 July. Overall, all
three operations achieved their objectives.5

Map of North Borneo and Sarawak area.
{8} The Australian 9th Division (less the 26th Brigade) under Major
General G. F. Wootten executed OBOE 6 with landings at the Brunei Bay
area and Labuan Island. The prime objective was to secure the vicinity
around Brunei Bay to provide for the establishment of a naval base,
as well as accessibility to oil and rubber resources of Brunei, northeastern
Sarawak, and North Borneo. Brigadier S. H. W. C. Porter and his 24th
Brigade were entrusted with the re-occupation of Labuan. The task of
securing the Brunei-Muara area was the responsibility of the 20th Brigade
under Brigadier W. J. V. Windeyer. A supporting naval force under Vice-Admiral
Dan Barbey, and the RAAF’s 1st Tactical Air Force, offered ample bombardment
and cover for the amphibious landings.6
{9} Within four days of the landings on 10 June 1945, all the initial
targets of OBOE 6 were attained. By mid-July the AIF were greatly involved
in civic action while their military role was increasingly becoming
redundant.
Laying the groundwork: the "Borneo project"
{10} The idea of sending a handful of European officers deep into the
interior of Borneo and behind Japanese lines, with the objective of
organizing the indigenous inhabitants to conduct a guerrilla war against
vital enemy targets, namely the oil installations, was discussed early
within Allied intelligence circles. These proposals, collectively referred
to as "The Borneo Project", sowed the seeds of what became
the covert operations undertaken by the Australian Services Reconnaissance
Department (SRD) in North Borneo and northeastern Sarawak during the
months leading to the launching of OBOE 6.
{11} As early as December 1941, there was a proposal for a scheme utilizing
guerilla tactics in Sarawak "to make periodic raids on the oilfields
[namely at Miri] from the interior and prevent the Japanese from making
effective use of them".7 Second Lieutenant
P. M. Synge of the British Intelligence Corps based in Oxford, England,
proposed that "a force of 500 men or more if necessary, skilled
in forest-craft, could be raised from the Long Houses of the Baram,
Tinfar [Tinjar] and Niah rivers and organised into an effective guerilla
force’. Benefiting from his participation in the Oxford Sarawak Expedition
of 1932, Synge had knowledge of the terrain and of the inhabitants of
northeastern Sarawak. He admitted, however, that such a force was "unlikely
to be able to effect recapture of or to hold the oilfields"; nonetheless
the continuous commando-style raids would "do much destructive
work".
{12} Following an interview with Intelligence officers from the War
Office, Synge, as requested, submitted a memorandum outlining in detail
his scheme of guerilla activity aimed at denying the enemy the full
utilization of the Miri oil installations.8
By mid-February the following year, Synge’s Sarawak scheme was apparently
considered "impracticable" for the time being.9
{13} Meanwhile, attempts were made to contact other members of the
Oxford Expedition, particularly the expedition leader, Tom Harrisson.10
By early July 1942, Harrisson submitted proposals that, in essence and
general outline, did not differ from Synge’s, with the notable exception
that the former placed more emphasis on the Seria rather than the Miri
oilfields. Furthermore Harrisson drew attention to the importance of
and the need to win "face" for the Allies.
The value on morale and confidence in the victory of Allied Nations
would be immensely increased both throughout the Pacific and in China
by the news that we were doing something even if slight in this area,
that we were on the offensive as well as the defensive. The value
of this question of "face" cannot be overemphasised.11
[italics added]
{14} Another proposal from Captain D. L. Leech envisaged the landing
in central Borneo of several ex-Brooke officers of the Sarawak civil
service and medical and wireless personnel "to establish W/T [wireless/radio
transmission] communication and to contact free Europeans and local
natives likely to be still loyal".12
Their tasks would be to organize the natives and Chinese in preparation
for assisting an Allied invasion, to undertake raids against Japanese
outposts, and, if necessary, to construct temporary landing grounds.
Leech also identified three main areas where anti-Japanese uprisings
could be launched: the Baram and Tinjar rivers, inhabited by the Kayans
and Kenyahs; the Rejang basin above Kapit, peopled mostly by Ibans;
and the Iban heartland of the Second Division13
(the Rejang River eastwards to the Sadong River).
{15} It was unclear how seriously the above-mentioned three proposals
were viewed by Allied military planners at the initial stage. At least
Harrisson’s proposal drew this rather encouraging response:
The scheme sounds "wild-cat" but is the sort of thing that
must be tried and might come off
The enterprising individual
should be given a run. The British Empire is foundering in the shoals
of caution, rather than breaking on the rocks of disaster.14
{16} It is evident from correspondence between London and Melbourne
that the various schemes proposed for Sarawak were not wholly shelved
but apparently put on hold during 1942 and 1943.15
Meanwhile the search for personnel "with experience and real knowledge
[of] British North Borneo and Sarawak" continued to be of high
priority.16 It was not until March 1945,
with the launching of SEMUT operations by the SRD, that the ideas and
suggestions put forth by Synge, Harrisson and Leech were translated
into action.
Covert operations in Northwest Borneo: AGAS and SEMUT
{17} The Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD) was an Australian
outfit directly responsible to General Sir Thomas Blamey, Commander-in-Chief
of the Australian Military Forces (AMF), based at Allied Land Headquarters
in Melbourne. SRD was a cover name for Special Operations Australia
(SOA) that had moved out of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB),17
and was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel P. J. F. Chapman-Walker.
{18} The SRD implemented the Borneo Project in a series of long-term
operations codenamed AGAS and SEMUT in North Borneo and Sarawak respectively.18
These SRD operations laid the groundwork to a certain extent, thereby
paving the way for the eventual invasion in mid-1945 at the Brunei Bay-Labuan
Island area. Basically, SRD operations focussed on two main objectives:
the gathering of intelligence, and organizing (including training and
arming) the local inhabitants into resistance groups to wage guerrilla
warfare.
{19} The precursors to AGAS and SEMUT were PYTHON 1 and 2 carried out
in North Borneo in the vicinity of Labian Point. PYTHON 1, led by Major
F. G. L. Chester with landings in early October 1943, undertook the
task of reporting on Japanese sea-traffic in the Sibutu Passage and
the Balabac Strait of the Sulu Sea. Chester also provided support for
a band of Filipino guerrillas under the command of an American officer,
Captain J. A. Hamner. In the later part of January 1944, Bill Jinkins
headed PYTHON 2 with the objective of organizing the native population
for guerrilla warfare. These early efforts did not bear any significant
results.
{20} More than a year passed before the first of several AGAS missions
were launched in North Borneo. AGAS 1 and 2 were carried out prior to
OBOE 6.19 In early March 1945, Chester
commanded AGAS 1 in a landing near Labuk Bay, and in less than a week
radio contact had been made with the Dutch station at Batchelor and
the SRD personnel at Leanyer. A field headquarters was established at
Sungei Sungei. Furthermore, drop zones (DZs) for stores were located
at Jambongan Island in late April and early May. A central signal station
was established at Lokopas, and a hospital for the native inhabitants
on Jambongan Island. Two months later, AGAS 2 led by Major R. G. P.
N. Combe, the pre-war district officer of Kudat, landed at Paitan Bay.
Combe organized guerrilla activity in the Pitas area and at the same
time established an intelligence network. AGAS 3, under Chester, focussed
on the Jesselton-Keningau-Beaufort sector. This project incorporated
STALLION Phase IV (explained below) with proposed long-term objectives.
{21} Meanwhile, in Sarawak, plans were in motion for SRD groups to
be parachuted into the mountainous hinterland of Brunei Bay. The initial
designated target areas were the headwaters of the Baram, Limbang, and
Trusan; later, the areas of operation expanded into the Padas valley
of North Borneo, southwards into territories of former Dutch Borneo,
and southeastwards to cover the Upper Rejang. These reconnaissance missions
were codenamed SEMUT under the overall command of Major G. S. ("Toby")
Carter. However, as the situation developed, the SEMUT operations were
divided into three distinct parties under individual commanders: SEMUT
1 under Major Tom Harrisson; SEMUT 2 led by Carter; and SEMUT 3 headed
by Captain W. L. P. ("Bill") Sochon. The areas of operation
were: SEMUT 1 the Trusan valley and its hinterland; SEMUT 2
the Baram valley and its hinterland; SEMUT 3 the entire Rejang
valley.
{22} Harrisson and members of SEMUT 1 parachuted into Bario in the
Kelabit Highlands during the later part of March 1945. Initially Harrisson
established his base at Bario; then, in late May, shifted to Belawit
in the Bawang valley (inside the former Dutch Borneo) upon the completion
of an airstrip for light aircraft built entirely with native labour.
In mid-April, Carter and his team (SEMUT 2) parachuted into Bario, by
then securely an SRD base with full support of the Kelabit people. Shortly
after their arrival, members of SEMUT 2 moved to the Baram valley and
established themselves at Long Akah, the heartland of the Kenyahs. Carter
also received assistance from the Kayans. Moving out from Carter’s party
in late May, Sochon led SEMUT 3 to Belaga in the Upper Rejang where
he set up his base of operation. Kayans and Ibans supported and participated
in SEMUT 3 operations. The nomadic Punans also extended a helping hand
to Sochon and his comrades.

SEMUT 2 party at Long Akah, May 1945. From left: Cpl Abu Kassan, Sgt
Jeh Soen Ken, Capt Bill Sochon, Sgt T. Barrie, Major Toby Carter, Sgt
C.W. Pare, Sgt K.D. Hallam, an unnamed POW rescued by the team, and
WO D.L. Horsnell.
AWM P00560.001
{23} Prior to 10 June, D-Day of OBOE 6, SRD operatives in North Borneo
(AGAS) and northern Sarawak (SEMUT) were relaying intelligence to Blamey’s
Advanced Land Headquarters at Morotai in the Halmaheras. Furthermore,
SRD parties particularly SEMUT in their respective areas
of operations were organizing, training, and arming native guerrilla
bands. Four days before the launch of OBOE 6, SEMUT 2 captured the Japanese
wireless station at Long Lama in the Baram; on the eve of D-Day, SEMUT
1 attacked small Japanese garrisons in the vicinity of the Brunei Bay
area.
STALLION and OBOE 6
{24} In addition to the gathering of intelligence from AGAS and SEMUT
field parties, preparations were underway for mounting reconnaissance
missions aimed at extracting specific information on the topography
and enemy dispositions in the immediate hinterland areas of Brunei Bay.20
An outline plan codenamed STALLION was drawn up on 29 April and involved
several phases employing a variety of methods to achieve their objective.
The various phases and their respective tasks are summarized as follows:21
- Phase I
- Collection of required information from parties already in the field,
that is, by AGAS and SEMUT.
- Phase II
- Extraction of natives from the Brunei Bay-Kimanis Bay area for interrogation.
- Phase III
-
- Creating deception by focussing enemy attention on the Kota Belud-Langkon
area through the extraction of natives from the Usukan Bay area.
- Phase IV
- Close reconnaissance of the Kimanis Bay area from Tanjong Nosong
to Tanjong Papar.
- Phases V-VIII
- Provision of Special Force (SF) Detachment and Special Task (ST)
Detachment as follows: 1 SF Detachment and 1 ST Detachment with 9th
Australian Division; 1 SF Sub-Detachment with 20th Brigade; and 1
SF Sub-Detachment with 24th Brigade. These detachments were to receive
intelligence supplied from the field by wireless transmission (WT).
A WT network between field parties (AGAS, SEMUT, STALLION), 9th Division
Headquarters, 20th Brigade, 24th Brigade, and Advanced Land Headquarters
at Morotai (also the base for Advanced SRD Headquarters).
{25} The flow of intelligence from AGAS and SEMUT parties reached Morotai
via WT providing up-to-date information of enemy dispositions, identification
of the Japanese Sago Butai Infantry Battalion that garrisoned Kuching,
enemy defences, and troop movements. The field parties also relayed
information about Japanese evacuation/escape routes from the east to
the west coasts, including staging points as well as the progress of
such movements. The location and movement of prisoners-of-war (POWs)
in Sarawak, particularly of the Kuching and Sandakan areas, were obtained.
The identification of airstrips and aircraft (hidden or camouflaged),
previously unreported, and ammunition and/or food dumps were notified
to Morotai. This intelligence effort fulfilled to a large extent the
objectives of Phase I.
{26} Meanwhile Phase II was implemented from 30 April to 19 May to
extract natives likely to have reliable knowledge of navigation in the
waters of Brunei Bay as well as information about landing beaches in
the bay itself.22 Phase II was subdivided
into Parts ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’.
{27} Phase IIA was undertaken on 1 May.23
Using Catalina aircraft, runs were made over Brunei Bay and Labuan Island.
Following two failed attempts, two prahu (native craft) were
intercepted north of Kampong Kuala Lawas. After interviewing eight Brunei
Malays, two brothers Latif bin Jalil and Gapar bin Jalil
were extracted. Aerial reconnaissance was made of Tanjong Nosong and
Pulau Tiga for topographical data. In neither location, no enemy activities
were detected nor were radar units identified. The Catalina also did
not face any anti-aircraft fire. Over Kimanis Bay, the party noted the
absence of rolling stock on the railway. Although the two airstrips
at Keningau appeared to be serviceable, there were no aircraft. The
Keningau-Tambunan road seemed to be in good condition and quite likely
to be metalled, but no traffic was observed.
{28} Through questioning of Latif bin Jalil (aged 25 years) and his
brother, Gapar bin Jalil (aged 27 years), SRD Headquarters acquired
invaluable intelligence of the Brunei Bay area. Some tactical information
of Japanese forces (disposition and strength, communications and transport),
geographical data (of offshore conditions of Kuala Mengalong, Kuala
Lawas, rivers and coastline), the socio-economic and political situation
in and around the Brunei Bay area were provided by the brothers.24
Nonetheless, neither individual was able to provide "advice regarding
the most suitable spots for sorties to land". However, they highly
recommended three sea captains (serang) from Kampong Mengalong
named Serang Daman, Serang Usop and Serang Saleh, the last being a second
cousin of the brothers.
{29} Acting on the suggestion of extracting the above-mentioned natives
from Kampong Mengalong, namely Serang Usop and Serang Saleh,25
Phase IIB was launched on 19 May. Also on the agenda was the extraction
of natives from the Kimanis Bay area, as well as intercepting sea-going
prahu en route from Brunei to Labuan Island. Altogether, four
natives were extracted: one from the Kimanis Bay area and three others
from Kampong Mengalong, including the village headman who was a known
Japanese sympathizer. Only one of the named individuals was extracted,
the others being unavailable.26 The party
succeeded in persuading two fellow villagers of Kampong Mengalong. After
a failed attempt to reach Kimanis village itself, a resident of the
Kimanis Bay area was chosen and brought back to Morotai. The mission
failed to intercept any prahu between Brunei and Labuan. On the
return journey, the Catalina managed to photograph the town of Tawau
on the southeast coast of North Borneo.
{30} Four days earlier, on 15 May, Phase IIC commenced with a dusk
landing in Brunei Bay of a party of five, including two Malays Latif
bin Ahmad27 and Gapar bin Jalil. The party
made for a point some two miles north of Kampong Mengalong. Their European
colleagues returned to the Catalina that left for Morotai. Latif and
Gapar obtained a prahu and headed for Labuan Island with the objective
of obtaining intelligence, as well as to arrange to extract a native
of the island for interrogation. At a pre-arranged location (a point
north of Kampong Mengalong) at dawn on 19 May, Latif and Gapar together
with a Labuan native were picked up by Catalina.28
An aerial reconnaissance revealed that there were good roads from Mempakul
to Menumbok,29 neither telephone lines
nor rolling stock or activity were evident in the Mempakul area, and
the area between Mempakul and Tanjong Sakat was firm and level ground.30
{31} Phase III was designed as a diversionary tactic in an attempt
to deceive the enemy into focussing his attention to the area between
Kota Belud and Langkong. The mission aimed at the extraction of natives
from the Usukan Bay to Kranga Point area. Five natives and a child were
extracted from the village of Kuala Tambal at the mouth of the Tuaran
River on 27 May and interrogated two days later.31
Later, another six more were extracted and their interrogation took
place on 30 May.32 Another thirteen followed,
mainly from the area north of Jesselton, and were interrogated on 1
June.33 The extraction of natives and landings
by Catalinas in the area had created "quite an appreciable amount
of attention" to the targeted vicinity.
{32} As part of efforts to deceive the enemy, AGAS parties in the field
spread rumours of an impending invasion and that natives should evacuate
the coastal area. AGAS operatives also carried out sabotage of communication
lines and other appropriate diversionary activity north of Jesselton.
These tactics commenced five days prior to D-Day (10 June). In support
of AGAS activities, leaflets from the Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO)
were rained on the Jesselton-Kota Belud-Langkong sector, adding credence
to the rumours. Bombings of key targets in the area further enhanced
SRD and FELO actions.
{33} Phase IV focussed on the reconnaissance of the Kimanis Bay area.
Specifically this mission aimed at gathering tactical data of enemy
dispositions in the Tanjong Nosong-Tanjong Papar area. Information about
the volume of traffic and the importance of the Beaufort-Papar Railway
sector was also required. The field party was entrusted with evaluating
the effects of aerial bombardment on the railways. Train derailment
and destruction of the Papar Bridge were on the agenda, as well as the
severing of telephone lines (to be executed on the eve of D-Day). All
enemy movements from Brunei northwards and from Jesselton southwards
were to be relayed to Morotai.34 Following
the successful implementation of AGAS 1 and 2, Major Chester was available
to undertake this assignment, as he had intimate knowledge of the area
of operation and had agents and known safe contacts. In addition to
the above-mentioned objectives, the party was instructed to obtain intelligence
of enemy movements along the Jesselton-Beaufort Railway, the Ranau-Tambunan-Keningau
Road, and the hinterland of Kimanis Bay.35
{34} Furthermore, during the post-OBOE 6 period, Chester and his unit
were to organize a native-protected intelligence network covering the
area between Ranau-Keningau Road and Jesselton-Beaufort Railway, and
to harass enemy activities on these lines of communications. During
this post-invasion phase also, they would be responsible for providing
early warning of any major enemy movement south from Ranau or Jesselton,
as well as to create a buffer zone for the protection of the Brunei
perimeter.36 The revised plan that incorporated
the long-term objectives of Phase IV was approved by 1st Australian
Corps and implemented under the codename AGAS 3.
{35} AGAS 3 (STALLION Phase IV) was launched on 29 May. Accompanying
Major Chester were Sergeant S. H. Wong Sue (Jack Sue), Corporal Heywood,
and Mandor Ali (an ethnic Malay). They were transported by Catalina
and inserted in the late afternoon at a point south of the Bongawan
River. Two days later, the party made contact with one Ah Lee, a Chinese
friend of Chester. Ah Lee was a long-serving worker with the North Borneo
Railway. At the time, he was appointed by the Japanese as stationmaster
of Bongawan Railway Station. Ah Lee promised to arrange a meeting between
Chester and a Chinese man named Chin Sang. Chin Sang was "Captain
China" (Kapitan China),37 an influential
Chinese leader of the area.

AGAS 1 party at Lokopas (in sarongs made from parachute silk). From
left: Ma'aruff bin Said, Sgt Jack Wong Sue, Maj Gort Chester, Skeet
Hywood, Mahammed Sariff.
{36} After much difficulty, Chester eventually had a meeting with Chin
Sang on 2 June. On the issue of cooperation as guerillas or long-term
intelligence agents both Chin Sang and Ah Lee refused outright.
They were, however, willing to provide, on the spot, information of
Japanese troop movements, concentrations, and other related matters.
Another Chinese man "of suitable guerilla age" who was contacted
also displayed little enthusiasm for cooperation.
{37} Meanwhile the party took cognizance of activities in and around
the railway track, such as train schedule, cargo to and from Beaufort
(stores and troops respectively), and the collection of timber by railway
contractors. Owing to the presence of many Japanese in the area, an
attempt to make contact with Ng Wai Wong, former Chief Clerk of Kimanis
Estate, was in vain. Similarly the effort of Mandor Ali to enter the
Papar area failed for the same reason. The party’s base had to be moved
four times for safety. Finally on 5 June, radio contact was made with
base; this had not been possible earlier, due to the proximity of the
enemy "within generator hearing distance".38
The party returned to base on 7 June.
{38} The plan for OBOE 6 envisaged the seizure, at the earliest practicable
time, of Mempakul and Weston, to facilitate the usage of Kimanis Harbour
and Beaufort respectively. This strategy was essential as a guard "against
enemy movement SOUTH from JESSELTON area to BRUNEI BAY with a view of
opposing [the Australian] occupation".39
For this purpose, a divisional reserve was constituted to carry out
the seizure of Mempakul or Weston "taking advantage of surprise,
before the enemy can organise sufficient resistance at these places
... [and if successful] a considerable advantage will be gained".
Therefore it was imperative that intelligence of enemy strengths at
both places be obtained.
{39} In this connection, two more phases of STALLION were launched.
Phases V and VI, with codename GELDING and MARE respectively, were to
fulfill the special request made by 9th Division for specific information
in the Mempakul-Menumbok and Weston-Sipitang areas, namely the north
side and the central part of Brunei Bay respectively.
{40} Lieutenant F. J. Leckie was party leader of GELDING. On 8 June
the party landed by Catalina on an uninhabited island at the mouth of
the Lakatan River. They intercepted a woman and child along the Padas
Damit River. Through her assistance, her husband was contacted, who
in turn brought men from the village of Melatup six miles upstream.
The headman of Melatup and a fellow villager agreed to escort Dalip
bin Achmed, a member of the party, to Weston. As the situation developed,
Dalip did not need to enter Weston; instead, two natives were brought
out on 10 June. Both were brothers and appeared to be "very reliable"
and "quite eager to help". They satisfactorily answered all
questions fielded to them about the Japanese, the local inhabitants
and situation, landing beaches, and other relevant information. The
party returned to base on 11 June.40
{41} MARE was launched simultaneously with GELDING at the same insertion
point. Two natives were extracted from Mempakul for interrogation. Another
two, each from Mempakul and Menumbok, confirmed the information procured
from the initial two informants. Having accomplished all objectives,
the party returned on 12 June.41
{42} STALLION Phase VII covered the activities carried out by SF Detachment
and ST Detachment for the 9th Division, Sub-Detachment ‘X’ for the 20th
Brigade, and Sub-Detachment ‘Y’ for the 24th Brigade. The detachment
and sub-detachments accompanied the 9th Division during the OBOE 6 landings
in Brunei Bay. Following the landings, Detachment Headquarters was established
on Labuan Island.
{43} STALLION Phase VIII was divided into three parts codenamed FILLY,
COLT and FAOL. All three missions were undertaken post-invasion by ST
Detachment. Briefly, FILLY (13-14 June) was aimed at ascertaining the
extent of enemy control and troop disposition in the Brunei Bay area
and on Pulau Daat (Daat Island), situated midway between Labuan and
Mempakul. COLT (16-18 June) involved the extraction of Kamu Mutu, a
Japanese administrator at Sipitang. The objective of FOAL (23-25 June)
was to contact an Indian, Kalia (Caleo) Khan of Membakut Estate, and
to capture Japanese in the Membakut district for interrogation.
Evaluating SRD contributions to OBOE 6
{44} The pre-invasion SRD long-term projects in North Borneo and Sarawak
AGAS and SEMUT achieved considerable results within a
short period. Consequently Operation OBOE 6 benefited from these achievements,
particularly the intelligence gathered by field parties. In addition,
the excellent rapport between field parties and native chieftains enabled
the re-establishment of some semblance of pre-war administration. The
direct contribution of AGAS and SEMUT to OBOE 6 was provision to the
1st Australian Corps and 9th Australian Division of fairly reliable
and continuous intelligence concerning enemy movements, concentration,
and disposition.
{45} In just three months, AGAS parties had accomplished several remarkable
results.42 AGAS 1 provided intelligence
of the Sandakan area that led to fruitful bombing raids. The party discovered
that Allied POWs initially known to be at Sandakan were being moved
in several groups inland to Ranau. Information on the Japanese escape
route from the east to the west coast led to continuous aerial attacks.
A guerilla-training camp and a hospital were established on Jambongan
Island. The training camp produced a native guerrilla force of 250 individually
selected men43 with small groups active
in the Lingkabau-Trusan-Beluran sector. More than 2,000 native inhabitants
benefited from the hospital. Practically all towns and villages throughout
the northeastern area of North Borneo had active native agents, or at
the least, Allied sympathizers. An invaluable radio link was created
between AGAS 1 headquarters at Sungei Sungei and other centres in former
Dutch Borneo and Morotai. The field party succeeded in establishing
several safe Catalina landing points and DZs in the operational area.
{46} The accomplishments of AGAS 2 were equally promising. Native agents
were placed throughout the entire northeastern peninsula area, Langkong,
Kudat and Bandau. AGAS 2 also succeeded in contacting Chinese guerillas
in Kota Belud. Furthermore, a native guerilla force between 150 and
250-strong was raised in the operational sector. A hospital was established
in the Lokopas area to cater for local needs. Intelligence from AGAS
2 reported that Pulau Banggi, on the northern tip of North Borneo facing
Marudu Bay, was free from enemy occupation.
{47} AGAS 3 (STALLION Phase IV), though unable to accomplish many of
its objectives owing to the strong enemy concentration in the operational
area of Jesselton-Keningau-Beaufort, conveyed intelligence which proved
beneficial to OBOE 6 planners. Under the prevailing circumstances of
Japanese strength (estimated to be nearly 6,000 troops between Jesselton
and Beaufort), post-invasion plans for this sector were devised to meet
this enemy concentration. Apart from the strong enemy presence, Chester
and his men observed that the Chinese in the area refused all cooperation
for fear of Japanese reprisals, as many Chinese guerillas had been killed
during a failed revolt in October 1943.44
Intelligence gained from this mission prevented a head-on clash with
the enemy.
{48} AGAS managed to supply reliable intelligence of enemy troop strengths
and dispositions. The figure of 31,000 reported in May 1945 appeared
to be not far off the total number of 35,000 officially recorded in
October.45 Also, reports that the Japanese
forces were evacuating the coast and moving inland were later proven
to be true. Nonetheless, there were criticisms of the performance of
AGAS operations as a whole.
{49} Alan Powell concluded that "Agas succeeded politically, had
little direct military value and failed as a POW rescue operation".46
The presence of AGAS operatives behind enemy lines was a great morale
booster for the return of the white men. Furthermore, the recruitment,
training and arming of local guerilla units were tangible indications
of the turning tide of the war and not mere propaganda dribble. But
members of local guerilla units could have made greater impact in harassing
a retreating enemy, except for their apathy, fear, and desire to return
home. The reluctance showed by local recruits was understandable given
Japanese reprisals following the failed 1943 rebellion. Despite the
apparent anti-Japanese feelings among the coastal Malays and Bajaus,
the Dusuns and Kadazans of the inland regions, and the urban Chinese,
there was real and general fear about taking action against the enemy.
It was not surprising, then, that some local guerrilla recruits deserted
their units to return to their home villages, perhaps strongly motivated
by their intention to defend their family against Japanese repression.
{50} Notwithstanding the incorporation of the objectives of "Operation
KINGFISHER" into the list of tasks of AGAS 1, there was never any
green light to execute the rescue mission of the POWs in Sandakan and/or
Ranau. AGAS 1 did fulfill the task of feeding SRD headquarters with
information about the POWs, including their subsequent movement inland
to Ranau in a series of infamous "Death Marches".
Impressive successes by SEMUT
{51} Remarkable success had also been achieved by SEMUT, particularly
1 and 2.47 As of June 1945, SEMUT 1 had
armed units operating in the Lawas, Trusan and Limbang Rivers and the
surrounding vicinity approximating the entire portion of northeastern
Sarawak. Furthermore SEMUT 1 had penetrated into North Borneo with an
outpost in the Pensiangan area and a party in control of the Padas River
as far north as Tenom. Also, an operational base was established at
Berang on the Mentarang River in Dutch Borneo while secondary bases
were on the Sembakong and Karayan rivers. Loembis and Malinau were secured
and patrols reached the Kayan River area. An extensive native intelligence
network throughout the operational area had supplied invaluable intelligence
on enemy dispositions and movements in Tutong, Brunei, the Brunei Bay
area, the sector from Brunei to Weston, and the Pensiangan-Keningau
area. SEMUT 1 had knowledge of Japanese escape routes from the Tarakan
and Malinau areas on the eastern coast towards North Borneo, and from
Brunei Bay up the Limbang and Trusan Rivers. The party also relayed
information about POWs and civilian internees in the operational area.
Medical service and supplies have been given to the natives. The completion
of an airstrip at Belawit facilitated the landings by Auster aircraft.
{52} Practically all the native settlements in the Trusan valley and
its hinterland were under the control of SEMUT 1. Some semblance of
pre-war administration had been re-established. Moreover, inhabitants
in this operational area had been organized and trained for defense
and for possible expansion of control in the near future when the situation
permitted. About 600 native militiamen were trained; a large number
of them supplied with arms and ammunition, and employed in offensives
against the enemy.
{53} SEMUT 1 parties in the field had been encouraging the native population
to deny food and labour to the enemy. Several Japanese patrols sent
to investigate and re-establish the supply line to the interior were
ambushed and decimated. Employment of this tactic resulted in the stoppage
of enemy movement northwards via Malinau and hindered the completion
of road construction from Weston to Brunei via Lawas, thereby effectively
preventing the southern movement of troops into the Brunei area.
{54} From its headquarters at Long Akah, SEMUT 2 fielded parties on
the Baram and Tutoh Rivers, established a sub-headquarters at Long Lama
on the Baram River and a detachment in the Tutoh basin. A strong patrol
made its presence in the vicinity of Marudi. Another sub-headquarters
was located at Long Lebang on the Tinjar River; and attempts were made
to effect control of the entire Tinjar valley and towards the coast
south of Miri. Native agents under the auspices of SEMUT 2 moved in
and out of enemy-occupied territory from Brunei southwards to Bintulu.
By June the operational area of SEMUT 2 had extended westwards, from
the Baram River to a line from Bintulu to the Upper Rejang.
{55} A native intelligence network established by SEMUT 2 provided
information of Japanese dispositions and troop movements in the Labuan,
Miri, Lutong, Kuala Belait, and Upper Rejang areas. Moreover, enemy
outposts and hideouts along the Baram and Tutoh Rivers were known, as
well as Japanese cross-country escape/evacuation routes southwards from
Bintulu to Long Nawan. Like the operational area in SEMUT 1, briefings
and direction given to native chieftains by SEMUT 2 created an approximation
of the pre-war administration in the Baram valley and neighbouring surroundings.
Small units of the 350-strong native guerilla force, organized, armed
and led by SEMUT 2, had engaged in skirmishes with the enemy.
{56} By June, SEMUT 3 had reached Belaga in the Upper Rejang and was
working westwards towards Kapit, with the intention of identifying suitable
points for Catalina landings. The party was in the process of making
contacts with the native population in order to establish an intelligence
network.
{57} SEMUT’s military successes were proudly highlighted by one of
its major players, Tom Harrisson. In his account published in 1959,
he quoted claims in a booklet produced by "Z" Special (SRD)
for the ceremonial unveiling of a war memorial on Garden Island, Western
Australia, that: "The Unit had inflicted some 1700 casualties on
the Japs at the cost of some 112 white lives".48
This same source credited Semut 1 with "over 1,000 Japanese killed",
out of the "Z" total of 1700, and noted that of the 112 white
deaths, none were lost in Semut I (or II, or III) operations.
{58} On intelligence gathering by SEMUT, Harrisson’s biographer offers
the following insight to his effective strategy:
Another result of Tom’s policy of scattering his operatives thinly
over a wide terrain was that it gave Tom, to whom the SEMUT 1 men
reported by radio and runner, an extraordinarily complete up-to-date
picture of the military and economic situation and the climate of
local opinion throughout northern Borneo, from Brunei Bay to Tarakan
Island. Drawing on this data, Tom sent frequent wireless messages
to "Z" Special headquarters, giving detailed intelligence
on enemy troops all along the coast of northern Borneo and recommending
specific targets for pinpoint bombing.49
{59} The sheer size of the area covered by SEMUT northern and
central Sarawak, southwestern British North Borneo, and northeastern
Dutch Borneo was an impressive accomplishment in itself. Harrisson
attributed the success of this vast coverage to "the remarkable
response of the native peoples of Sarawak and all within Borneo".50
A fitting tribute to SEMUT is that by Powell, who commented:
Semut did give help to the AIF in providing Intelligence and diverting
attention from their Borneo landings, but far and away their clearest
value lie in the great boost they gave local moral, self-confidence
and the re-establishment of peaceful administration after war’s end.51
STALLION and specific intelligence
{60} Equally, if not more, useful was the specific intelligence supplied
by the STALLION Project. Commented the report on SRD activities supporting
OBOE 6, "A great deal of valuable intelligence was made available
to the invading forces through operatives of SRD working often under
difficult and very dangerous conditions in operation, STALLION".
Practically almost all the objectives the request for detailed
intelligence were supplied by the various phases of the STALLION
operation.52
{61} Requests for intelligence from AGAS and SEMUT under STALLION Phase
I had been adequately fulfilled. Phase II (A, B, C) supplied the information
regarding the navigation of Brunei Bay waters and landing beaches in
the bay area itself. Intimate knowledge of conditions, particularly
of infrastructure on Labuan Island, was provided by Phase IIB. In order
to offset enemy suspicion, diversionary tactics were carried out in
Usukan Bay area under Phase III. Detailed intelligence relating to enemy
strength, dispositions, activity and movement, defences, gun positions,
obstacles, and bivouac areas in the Mempakul-Menumbok and Weston-Sipitang-Beaufort
sectors was obtained from Phase VI (MARE), as well as Phases IIB and
V (GELDING) respectively. Likewise Phase IV (AGAS 3) informed OBOE 6
planners of enemy strength and activities in and around Jesselton, the
track in the Ranau-Tambunan-Keningau-Tenom area, and provided intelligence
on the Jesselton-Beaufort railway.
Reliability of information
{62} Reflecting upon the foregoing review of SRD operations relating
to OBOE 6, attention is drawn to the issue of the reliability of information
from native sources. Owing to the conspicuous nature of European presence
in enemy-held territory, it was imperative that a great deal of reliance
for the task of gathering intelligence was on local, indigenous or Chinese,
agents and/or contacts. Apparently, the reliability of intelligence
from local sources was suspect, if not erroneous. Incidences were reported
where the progress of the AIF advance was hindered by "battalions
being filled with false bogeys due to exaggerated and incorrect estimates"
of enemy strength and dispositions.53
{63} It can not be denied that the intelligence gathered by SRD field
parties AGAS and SEMUT, as well as STALLION were procured
from mostly native and, to a lesser extent, Chinese, sources. Under
the circumstances, field parties were instructed to lean "towards
the capture of Japanese bodies
and also to recces [reconnaissance]
by the parties themselves".54 However,
SRD defended itself and explained that the "blame" for inaccurate
intelligence came from other sources:
It was pointed out to him [Major General Wootten] that a great deal
of misleading infm [information] had come from Chinese and natives
rounded up in the advance, and that the staff had not sifted out the
good from the bad in assessing and compiling the infm. The interrogators
have been passing on the infm as given, without sufficient emphasis
on the reliability of the subject. Some of these estimates have been
truly absurd.55
{64} On the other hand, information from local sources was often valuable,
as demonstrated by the MARE and GELDING operations where the intelligence
supplied proved to be correct.56 Nonetheless,
the following case of intelligence from STALLION Phase IV (AGAS 3) illustrates
Wootten’s dissatisfaction.
It has been found from captured [Japanese] documents that an Independent
Mixed Bde did, in fact, reinforce the Beaufort area, and their full
strength would have been approx 5,500, BUT, according to the same
documents, 60% of these failed to arrive through sickness, death or
straggling, and of these 60% another 40% were not in a position to
fight due to sickness or loss of weapons. Therefore the estimate,
good as it was, is much too over-estimated to satisfy Divisional requirements.57
{65} Another complication in the supply of accurate and reliable information
was the prevalence of rumours.58 Local
informants may not always have been privy to the required information
and consequently passed on rumours to SRD operatives, not because they
deliberately intended to mislead but owing to their inability to differentiate
between fact and opinion, truth and mere "talk". The solution
appeared to be to require more than one source of intelligence for corroboration
and/or confirmation of claims.
{66} Also, in this connection, as well as taking cue from the experiences
of field parties, the following rule of practice needed to be followed:
owing to the intensive Jap[anese] counter-espionage activities
through the medium of native informers, it is not practicable to insert
a European party into any particular locality from which intelligence
is of military importance without at least one of the party ha[v]ing
local knowledge or native contacts. On the other hand, it is also
impracticable to secure effective intelligence results working through
native agents alone, without white supervision.
[in order]
to create an effective intelligence organisation in a Malay-speaking
area, it is necessary to use white organisers who should be able to
speak Malay, have a knowledge of the country in which they are to
work, and as far as possible be acquainted with individual natives
with whom initial contacts could be made. The party must, as soon
as possible after insertion, instal[l] itself in a safe HQ [headquarters]
with WT [wireless transmission] communication and from that HQ extend
its activities in the form of a wide network into the area from which
intelligence is required.59
{67} Furthermore, travel restrictions imposed by the Japanese notwithstanding,
apparently the dissemination of information within the native community
continued unaffected. Capitalizing from this advantage, field parties
could procure intelligence particularly from natives of the higher class
(chieftains, headmen) "at a considerable distance from the actual
target area".60
{68} In summarizing SRD operations in conjunction with requirements
of OBOE 6, Major K. F. Mollard, the officer commanding SF Detachment,
noted that:
So far Div [9th Division] have been most satisfied with results.
"MARE" and "GELDING" information was most welcome,
the "AGAS III" report not so welcome but nice to know and
"SEMUT I and II" are in a position to give us a great deal
of information in the near future.61
KINGFISHER: SRD bungle or American reluctance?
{69} Between 1942 and 1943 some 2750 Allied prisoners of war, mainly
Australians and British, were shipped from Singapore to Sandakan.62
They were utilized by the Japanese as slave labour in the construction
of a military airfield. Captain Susumi Hoshijima, the Sandakan camp
commandant, was a harsh taskmaster. The combination of overwork, poor
nutrition and even starvation, coupled with harsh treatment, daily beatings,
torture, and an assortment of tropical diseases (beri-beri, malaria,
dysentery, tuberculosis), led to the death of many of the POWs. Following
the discovery of a clandestine camp radio in mid-1943, the responsible
parties were duly executed. As a security measure, the Japanese dispatched
most of the Australian and British officers to the main POW and internment
camp at Batu Lintang, Kuching. Only eight officers remained behind at
Sandakan with the mostly enlisted men.
{70} Between December 1943 and May 1945, the death toll at Sandakan
was 1100. In order to avoid the recurring Allied bombings of coastal
areas from the early part of 1945, the Japanese moved the remainder
POWs in three forced marches inland, the first in January, the second
in May followed by another in June. Out of the more than 1000 who made
the "Death March", only 450 reached the interior destination
of Ranau. Death from exhaustion, starvation, and disease claimed the
lives of the bulk of the marchers; those who were too weak to continue
were shot, others bayoneted to death. Two Australians managed to escape
during the second march. Another four Australians miraculously succeeded
in escaping from the Ranau camp. None survived Ranau; likewise there
were no survivors from the 300 remaining at Sandakan after the second
march inland.63

Pictured in October 1945, the burnt-out remains of a compound at Sandakan
where the bodies of 300 murdered prisoners of war were discovered.
AWM 120463
{71} According to an AGAS preliminary operational report covering the
period 24 February to 31 May 1945, three objectives were outlined:
- To establish a base on the east coast of B.N.B. [British North Borneo]
with W/T [wireless transmission] communication to AUSTRALIA.
- To set up a native intelligence network in B.N.B., particular
importance being attached to detailed information on the PW [prisoners
of war] camp at SANDAKAN (originally project KINGFISHER) [emphasis
added] and the high priority target indicated by GHQ [General Headquarters],
KUDAT.
- Through the medium of known agents, to establish friendly relations
with the natives and ultimately to organise such armed resistance
as might be authorised by GHQ.64
{72} It seems then that a prime focus of AGAS operatives was to gather
intelligence relating to the Sandakan POWs. Apparently this objective
proved to be quite successful because "an extensive system of contacts
has been extended, and agents have been placed in and around SANDAKAN,
BELURAN, LINKABAU, KUDAT and LANGKON".65
Acting upon the information received from AGAS, the results were as
follows:
- The destruction by air of approx. 600 Japs in SANDAKAN, plus 9 motor
launches. ...
- Much reliable information has been passed on as to Japanese movements
from SANDAKAN to RANAU, the extent of troop movements and concentrations
in KHOTA [KOTA] BELUD, LANGKON and KUDAT, and the move of the PW Camp,
previously in SANDAKAN, in groups to RANAU. ...
{73} It is amply clear that AGAS operatives in the field possessed
detailed as well as accurate information as to the situation of the
POWs of Sandakan, including their movements "in groups to RANAU",
namely the "Death March". Furthermore, Major Chester, the
leader of AGAS, claimed inter alia that "There has been
no break or trouble in communication from the date of the first contact
[February 1945] up to the present moment [May 1945]".66
{74} If the AGAS report is to be believed, and there is no apparent
reason to doubt its veracity, why then was no attempt been made to effect
the planned rescue of the Sandakan POWs that is, implement Operation
KINGFISHER? KINGFISHER, conceived sometime in mid-1944, proposed a rescue
plan of POWs in Sandakan by a paratroop unit.67
The probable reason for aborting KINGFISHER has been hotly debated,
with arguments ranging from a conspiratorial cover-up that implicated
Australia’s military elite to MacArthur’s non-cooperation in providing
vital support for the operation.
{75} Blamey’s speech at the Second Annual Conference of the Australian
Armoured Corps Association in Melbourne on 19 November 1947 apparently
"let the cat out of the bag". Lieutenant Colonel (later Sir)
John Overall’s 800-strong paratroop battalion which had been training
at the Atherton Tableland for a covert operation that never came through
knew nothing of the details of their mission until Blamey’s address.
We had complete plans for them [paratroopers]. Our spies [AGAS and
its local agents] were in Japanese-held territory. We had established
the necessary contacts with prisoners at Sandakan, and our parachute
troops were going to relieve them. ... But at the moment we wanted
to act, we couldn’t get the necessary aircraft to take them in
[emphasis added]. The operation would certainly have saved that death
march of Sandakan.68
{76} Lynette Ramsay Silver argued that Blamey blamed MacArthur as an
excuse to cover-up an SRD bungle in the gathering of accurate intelligence.69
The Blamey-MacArthur relationship had never been cosy, each accusing
the other of attempting to undermine his authority. Blamey, she claimed,
told Air Vice-Marshal George Jones, the Chief of the Air Staff, that
"while he [Blamey] had not submitted his rescue plan to the Australian
government or other authorities, he had raised it with MacArthur, ‘who
did not favour it’".70
{77} Silver denounced Blamey’s claim about "getting the necessary
aircraft" as utter nonsense which was not supported by evidence.
First, she said, it was absurd to blame MacArthur and the American reluctance
to supply the necessary air transport. No such request was made to MacArthur,
who evidently then had at his disposal 600 C-47s. If the Americans were
reluctant as was claimed, the RAAF had in its own pool of 71 C-47s.
According to KINGFISHER, only 34 aircraft were required. Secondly, and
more conclusively, there was no need of American planes or that of the
RAAF, as SRD itself had its own exclusive Air Section, codenamed 200
Flight, which had been established in February 1945. As of March, there
were in operation six Liberators (B-24s) utilized in dropping personnel
and "storpedoes"71 in Borneo
and Timor.

An Australian inspection party ashore on Berhala Island, in Sandakan
Harbour, 23 October 1945. At centre is Captain R. K. McLaren of SRD
and "Z" Special Force, who had been speaking with a local
Chinese (left) about a dummy Japanese anti-aircraft gun.
AWM 121752
{78} According to Silver, Blamey used MacArthur as the scapegoat for
SRD’s failings. SRD apparently seriously blundered in Timor. Not realizing
that its operatives were being compromised, SRD continued over a two-year
period to provide "regular supplies of stores, ammunition, weapons,
gold and money" to the Japanese.72
Unknowingly, 32 operatives dropped into Timor were lost to the enemy
as a consequence of the breach of security. This bungle was kept under
wraps. Silver considered that a similar bungle occurred in Borneo.
Mid-1945 had been a nightmare period for those controlling SRD. At
about the same time they had learned there was a problem in Timor,
the Borneo mission had been in ruins. Faced with a calamity of huge
proportions, the repercussions for which would be immense, they had
begun to lay the groundwork for a massive cover-up.
{79} Nonetheless two individuals believed Blamey’s explanation of KINGFISHER
being stood down due to MacArthur’s failure to provide the necessary
air transport, namely Overall, the commanding officer of the paratroop
battalion, and Athol Moffitt, the Allied prosecutor at the Labuan war
crimes trials, whose book about Project KINGFISHER was published in
1989. Overall was convinced that the rescue plan was aborted because
MacArthur had refused to supply the planes for his paratroopers. In
later years, during an interview with Moffitt, Overall in retrospect
re-confirmed his stance:
Yes, there had been a plan to rescue the Sandakan prisoners. We were
asked by Army HQ [Aust.] to undertake the rescue in the belief there
were only third class Japanese troops there. ... General Morshead
pressed the plan, and I understood General Blamey wanted it, but the
US would not release the planes to make the drop. Certainly our HQ
wanted it.73
But at the back of his mind was another belief, which he confessed
ten years: "I am told, and I believe it to be so, that there was
a series of cover-ups".74
{80} For his part, Moffitt did not suspect the possibility of a cover-up,
and wholly accepted Blamey’s explanation of putting the blame on the
Americans, namely MacArthur:
The truth is that the Australian Paratroop Battalion was,
as Blamey said, trained for the rescue operation. The truth
is that the plan could not proceed because Australia did not have
the transport and drop planes for its paratroops and MacArthur’s HQ
declined to provide them.75 [emphases
added]
{81} However, Major Chester, the leader of AGAS party, was well aware
of SRD’s shortcomings. He confided with Sergeant Wong Sue, telling him
"You know what they’re going to do? Blamey’s going to shift the
blame for all their bungling onto MacArthur".76
Chester, however, was unable to challenge Blamey in 1947; he died of
blackwater fever at Jesselton (Kota Kinabalu) in August 1946. Nor was
there much the Chinese Wong Sue could do at the time to dispute Blamey’s
claim.77
{82} Denis Emerson-Elliott, a member of SOE-Far East who was privy
to various SRD operations (JAYWICK, RIMAU, PYTHON and KINGFISHER), confessed
five decades after the end of the war:
It was a mess from beginning to end. The intelligence was a disaster.
The bungling on the planning side was dreadful, so Blamey decided
to blame MacArthur. A dreadful show all round. But by the time the
truth was realised it was too late to do anything except blame
MacArthur.78
{83} But two writers Alan Powell and Don Wall maintain
that KINGFISHER was of low priority and therefore subsequently aborted.
Powell stated that despite the continuous flow of intelligence from
AGAS operatives to SRD headquarters "yet neither Agas 1 nor Agas
3 parties made any attempt to carry out the detailed investigation of
Sandakan prescribed for KINGFISHER".79
The non-action, according to Powell, "was the reduction of the
KINGFISHER project to third place in the Agas 1 priority list behind
the founding of an Intelligence network and a guerilla force in [N]orth
Borneo".
{84} The "low priority" thesis is supported by the principle
expressed by C. H. Finlay, commanding officer of "Z" Special
Unit and sometime acting deputy director of SRD:
Wars are essentially cruel and brutal and in the execution of the
principal object no activity which does not contribute to the achievement
of that objective (in this case the earliest possible defeat of Japan
in its homeland) can be entertained.80
{85} Furthermore, Powell asserts that there were those who feared that
if a rescue attempt was not completely successful, the Japanese might
annihilate the remainder. "By the last days of the war," he
claims, "the Japanese would stop at nothing to conceal the evidence
against them ..."81 This fear was
unfounded, however, as despite the Australian landings (OBOE 6) at Brunei
Bay on 10 June 1945, no grand slaughter of POWs or civilian internees
were evident.
{86} Wall concurs with Powell that KINGFISHER was low on the SRD agenda
and that priorities lay elsewhere.82 He
wholly rejected the notion that there was a cover-up in order to disguise
the shortcomings of SRD in the gathering of accurate information. Like
Powell, Wall also expressed the probable backlash of the Japanese if
there was an attempt to rescue of the POWs.
{87} Although Silver argued rather convincingly that there was a cover-up
of SRD failings (translated into Blamey’s blunder) and putting the blame
on the Americans, it is difficult to dismiss the evidence from the AGAS
operational report of February-May 1945. From my own research I tend
to agree with Powell that the rescue of POWs was low in the priority
of the AIF. Preparations were in earnest for the launching of the OBOE
operations, and it would have been a diversion of effort to mount a
rescue attempt in the midst of the overall invasion plan. Furthermore,
as pointed out, there was a genuine fear that an attempted rescue operation
might effectively sign the death warrant for all POWs and civilian internees.
History, however, did not witness a Japanese massacre of POWs but during
the momentous months prior to the landings, a Japanese vindictive backlash
was a real possibility. "The bitter irony of this concern,"
Powell pointed out, "is that when some might have been saved, all
were left to die."83
Conclusion
{88} The OBOE 6 operation has been described as well planned and efficiently
executed. There was no doubt that the role of the SRD, particularly
in supplying intelligence, could not be underestimated. Notwithstanding
the problems of obtaining reliable intelligence, SRD field operatives
provided the required information that, in no small measure, contributed
to the unqualified success of the invasion. Moreover, the various SRD-led
native guerrilla units posed an "irritant" to the enemy, aptly
living up to being "sandflies" (AGAS) and "ants"
(SEMUT).
{89} Notwithstanding the successful landings at Brunei Bay and Labuan,
there was still a long way to go for the AIF following D-Day. It was
another month or so before the military phase was concluded. SRD operatives
continued with their task of gathering information of the enemy, and
creating trained and armed native guerrilla units. The continuous supply
of intelligence on enemy dispositions, activities and movements enabled
the regular forces to focus on specific offensive actions in eliminating
the enemy. SRD-led native guerilla bands complemented the AIF in mopping-up
operations, thereby hastening the re-occupation process.
{90} And as for the sad ending of the Sandakan POWs, their rescue took
a backseat to "the execution of the principal object", namely,
the re-occupation of Borneo and the defeat of Japan.
{91} Thanks to the successes achieved by SRD long-term field parties
AGAS and SEMUT in establishing a semblance of pre-war
administration in relatively vast areas under their de facto
authority, the task of establishing civil control, once hostilities
ended, was made much easier. But of more importance, this SRD sanctioned
native administrative structure minimized the high risks of civil disorder
or even all-out open clashes between rival groups during the interregnum,
from the cessation of hostilities to the establishment of stable government.
{92} In relation to the establishment of stable administration, the
British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit (BBCAU) was constituted under the
command of 1st Australian Corps. The chief responsibility of BBCAU was
to exercise administrative control of re-occupied areas as the regular
forces advanced. Discussions between Lieutenant Colonel Chapman-Walker
(SRD) and Brigadier C. F. C. Macaskie (BBCAU) produced guidelines for
implementation as occasion dictated.84
These required SRD personnel to act as advance representatives of BBCAU.
For its part, BBCAU would furnish SRD with "all policy directives
intended for CA [Civil Affairs] officers, and keep SRD informed on all
matters of general policy in connection with the administration of territory".
SRD-BBCAU cooperation was effected in this manner. BBCAU was also to
provide SRD with officers85 to assist their
field parties in territories not yet re-occupied. Subsequently, as areas
controlled by SRD were re-occupied, they were to hand over to BBCAU
personnel operating in those areas, and release all personnel with pre-war
experience of British Borneo then serving with SRD once the re-occupation
of British Borneo was complete. The working arrangement between SRD
and BBCAU, although not devoid of friction and hitches, produced overall
satisfactory results as the re-occupation progressed.
{93} After having laid the groundwork in the months leading to the
OBOE 6 operation, SRD operatives in the field had to shoulder a heavier
burden of responsibility during the post-invasion period. SRD personnel
in their respective spheres of influence and control faced not only
the military task in handling a retreating enemy, but also an even more
formidable undertaking in attending to civilian problems of food and
medical supplies, and an increasing possibility of inter-ethnic troubles.
The author
Dr Ooi Keat Gin is associate professor in South-East Asian socioeconomic
history and historiography at the School of Humanities, Universiti Sains
Malaysia, in Penang, Malaysia. He has published several books, including
World beyond the rivers (1996), Of free trade and native interests
(1997), Japanese empire in the tropics (1998), Rising sun
over Borneo (1999) and From colonial outpost to cosmopolitan
centre (2002). Dr Ooi is currently working on the Japanese occupation
of Kalimantan (Indonesia), and holds a fellowship with the International
Institute for Asian Studies at Leiden, Netherlands. The research and
initial writing of this article on the SRD in Borneo was carried out
as inaugural fellow at the Australian War Memorial in 1999. A version
was presented as a working paper at the 16th Conference of the International
Association of Historians of Asia at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, in July
2000.
Endnotes
- About March 1942 the Anglo-American military chiefs,
referred to as the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), decided that the
Americans should be given the major role in wresting the Pacific from
Japan. Accordingly, two theatres of spheres of operations were designated.
The Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), encompassing the central and southern
Pacific, came under the command of Admiral Chester Nimitz in Hawaii.
The other theatre, designated the South-West Pacific Area (SWPA),
covered Australia, New Guinea, the Netherlands East Indies (excluding
Sumatra), the Bismarck Archipelago, and Solomon Islands, and came
under the Australia-based command of MacArthur.
- Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: the Far
Eastern general (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.89-90.
- The first phase of MONTCLAIR, completed in mid-April
1945, witnessed the successful landings at Panay, Cebu and Negros
in the southern parts of the Philippines.
- The proposed OBOE operations were: 1 Tarakan;
2 Balikpapan; 3 Banjermasin; 4 Surabaya/Batavia;
5 the eastern Netherlands East Indies (the Spice Islands);
and 6 British North Borneo.
- For a detailed account of OBOE 1, see Peter Stanley,
Tarakan: an Australian tragedy (Sydney: Allen & Unwin,
1997). For OBOE 6, see A.V.M. Horton, "Operation 'OBOE Six' (June
to August 1945)", Sarawak Gazette, July 1985, pp.40-50.
Apart from the treatment in Gavin Long, The final campaigns
(Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1963), the Australian operations
at Balikpapan (OBOE 2) have yet to receive separate scholarly attention.
- For air aspects of the campaign, see Gary Waters,
Oboe: air operations over Borneo, 1945 (Canberra: Air Power
Studies Centre, c.1995).
- Second Lieutenant P. M. Synge, Intelligence Corps
Depot, Oxford, to Commandant, Intelligence Corps, 22 December 1941,
"Subject: [A] Scheme for Guerilla Activity Sarawak",
HS1/247, Public Record Office (PRO), England.
- "Record of Meeting held at 2, Fitzmaurice
Place, [London], between 2/Lt. Synge, O, L/IO & L/Pet, 13 January
1942", HS1/247, PRO; and Second Lieutenant P. M. Synge, Intelligence
Corps Depot, Oxford, to Major Stoford-Adams, War Office, London, 15
January 1942, "Subject: [A] Scheme for Guerilla Activity
Sarawak, Memorandum No.2", HS1/247, PRO.
- See cipher telegram from Batavia, 15 February 1942,
HS1/247, PRO.
- Although Synge made the original proposal, it
was felt that he, "although a good type, was not the right
type actually to lead any expedition to BORNEO" (emphasis added);
instead other members of the Oxford Expedition of 1932 Harrisson,
Shackleton, Hartley were considered more appropriate candidates.
See ‘Record of Meeting held at 2, Fitzmaurice Place, 13 January 1942’.
- L. J. Carver to Colonel D. R. Guiness, Secret
Operations Executive, 9 July 1942, enclosing "Notes from T. Harrisson",
HS1/185, PRO.
- Plan for Sarawak submitted by Capt. D. L. Leech,
7 July 1942, HS1/185, PRO.
- The pre-war administrative delineation of Sarawak
into five "Divisions" was based on the major river basins:
First Lundu, Sarawak, Sadong, Samarahan; Second Lupar,
Saribas, Skrang, Krian; Third Rejang, Baleh; Fourth
Tinjar, Baram; Fifth Limbang, Trusan.
- AD/U.1 to AD/U., 15 July 1942, "Harrisson’s
Project for Sarawak", HS1/185, PRO.
- For instance, see L/IW to D/U, 2 September 1942,
enclosing "Borneo Oilfields Project, 25 July 1942", and
D/U.5 to AD/L, 3 September 1942, HS1/185, PRO. An undated handwritten
note on the file ("Comments by B/B") argued that the proposals
were "a good thing, if only from a prestige point of view",
but remarked that such expeditions needed to be organized in Australia
with American assistance.
- For instance, see cipher telegram from Melbourne,
23 November 1943, HS1/185, PRO.
- The background of SRD was in the tangled and complex
web of intelligence organizations under the umbrella of the AIB. The
beginnings of SRD can be traced to the Inter-Allied Services Department
(ISD), established in April 1942, under the command of Colonel G.
E. Mott, British Special Operations Executive (SOE). ISD was actually
a covername for SOA. In February 1943, ISD changed to SOA and became
Section ‘A’ of AIB. AIF personnel in SOA constituted ‘Z’ Special Unit.
Following a re-organization in AIB, SOA assumed its new cover-name
SRD and, together with ‘Z’ Special Unit, moved out of
the newly restructured AIB.
- AGAS is Malay for "sandfly", while SEMUT
means "ant".
- Three more AGAS operations were undertaken during
the post-invasion phase, namely AGAS 3 (21 June, Jambongan Island),
AGAS 4 (11 July, Semporna at the south side of Darvel Bay), AGAS 5
(27 July, Talasai at the northern part of Darvel Bay). By September
1945, all AGAS operatives were recalled.
- See Major General G. F. Wootten, General Officer
Commanding 9th Australian Division, to 1st Australian Corps, 25 April
1945, "Subject: SRD Requirements OBOE Six", AWM 54/627/4/13.
- See Colonel Chapman-Walker, Director SRD, to AIB
for 1st Australian Corps, 29 April 1945, "Operation: STALLION
(SRD Commitments OBOE VI) Outline Plan", AWM 54/627/4/13.
- The categories of natives to be extracted were
accorded the following priority: 1 - "members of Brunei tribe",
meaning Brunei Malays; 2 - Chinese; 3 - prahu (native craft)
skippers and crew; 4 - others.
- For details of STALLION Phase IIA, see "Party
Leader’s Report: Operation STALLION Phase II [A]", A. G. Hands,
Squadron Leader, 1 May 1945, AWM 54/619/7/60 Pt.2.
- For details of information provided by the two
brothers, see "Operation STALLION: Interrogation Report",
3 May 1945, AWM 54/619/7/60 Pt.1.
- Ibid. Although reputed to be a reliable source,
Serang Daman was deemed too old for his extraction to be practical.
Both Serang Usop and Serang Saleh were both "quoted as very reliable".
- No names were given in the interrogation report,
so it is uncertain whether Serang Usop and Serang Saleh were transported
to Morotai. Two of the natives from Kampong Mengalong were brothers,
and both were sailors. Another was stated as aged 30 years, married
with one child, and a resident of the same village. The native from
the Kimanis Bay area lived upriver and had been engaged in a "telephone
upkeep gang" on the railway along the western coast of North
Borneo. See Services Reconnaissance Department, Operation STALLION,
Report No.2, 9 May 1945, AWM 54/619/7/60 Pt.2.
- The name "Latif bin Ahmad" was stated
in the report, but it is highly probable that this individual was
the same twenty-five year old Latif, the younger brother of Gapar.
See "Report on SRD Activities Supporting the A.I.F. Landing at
Brunei Bay British North Borneo", National Archives of
Australia (NAA) A3269/12 A21/B, p.11.
- For details of information gained from the interrogation
of the native from Labuan, see Services Reconnaissance Department,
Operation STALLION, Intelligence Report No.3, 24 May 1945,
AWM 54/619/7/60 Pt.2.
- Menumbok is preferred to other variations like
Memumbok, Menumbuk or Memubok.
- "Report on SRD Activities Supporting the
A.I.F. Landing at Brunei Bay British North Borneo", p.12.
- Services Reconnaissance Department, Operation
STALLION, Intelligence Report No.4, 29 May 1945, and Intelligence
Report No.5, 1 June 1945, AWM 54/619/7/60 Pt. 2.
- Report on Interrogation of Natives Extracted from
Usukan Bay Area, 30 May 1945, AWM 54/619/7/60 Pt.2.
- See Services Reconnaissance Department, Operation
STALLION, Intelligence Report No.6, 5 June 1945, AWM 54/619/7/60
Pt.2, and Director SRD [Colonel Chapman-Walker] to Controller AIB
[Brigadier K. A. Wills], 3 June 1945, AWM 54/619/7/60 Pt.1.
- Colonel Chapman-Walker, Director SRD, to AIB for
1st Australian Corps, 29 April 1945, "Operation STALLION (SRD
Commitments OBOE VI) Outline Plan", AWM 54/627/4/13, p.3.
- Colonel Chapman-Walker, Director SRD, to AIB for
1st Australian Corps, 23 May 1945, "Operation STALLION (OBOE
VI)", AWM 54/627/4/13.
- Ibid.
- Kapitan China was the title given to the local
Chinese communal leader by the pre-war British North Borneo administration.
- For details of this mission, see "STALLION
Phase IV: Operational Report AGAS III", 10 June 1945,
included as Appendix G in "Report on SRD Activities Supporting
the A.I.F. Landing at Brunei Bay British North Borneo",
prepared by G Branch, SRD Headquarters, Melbourne, 1 October 1945,
NAA A3269/12 A21/B.
- Major General G. F. Wootten, [General Officer]
Commanding 9th Australian Division, to Advanced [Headquarters] 1st
Australian Corps, 22 May 1945, AWM 54/627/4/13.
- For details of this mission, see "Report
on 'GELDING' Project 8 to 10 Jun[e] [19]45. By Lieut. T. J.
Leckie", undated, included as Appendix H in "Report on SRD
Activities Supporting the A.I.F. Landing at Brunei Bay British
North Borneo", prepared by G Branch, SRD Headquarters, Melbourne,
1 October 1945, NAA A3269/12 A21/B.
- For details of this mission, see "Operational
Report 'MARE' Project", Captain M. L. Drew, Party Leader,
undated, Appendix I in "Report on SRD Activities Supporting the
A.I.F. Landing at Brunei Bay British North Borneo", prepared
by G Branch, SRD Headquarters, Melbourne, 1 October 1945, NAA A3269/12
A21/B.
- For details of AGAS operations executed prior
to OBOE 6, see Memorandum on S.R.D. Operations in British Borneo,
February June, 1945, Appendix A: Preliminary Operational Report
of Party AGAS covering period from 24 Feb to 31 May [19]45, 29 May
1945, NAA A3269/12 A28/B.
- The natives selected for training, given arms,
and organized to form guerilla units were either those formerly in
the service of the pre-war administration or those who held positions
of responsibility in their communities and/or districts.
- Lieutenant Albert I. N. Kwok led an anti-Japanese
revolt in October 1943 and occupied Jesselton. The Japanese reprisals
were swift and ruthless, and many settlements along the western coast
of North Borneo suffered. No scholarly study of this uprising has
been undertaken. A narrative account of this episode by a North Borneo
administrator is Maxwell Hall, Kinabalu Guerrillas: an account
of the Double-Tenth 1943 ([Kuching]: Borneo Literature Bureau,
n.d.).
- Gavin Long, The final campaigns, pp.456,
555.
- Alan Powell, War by stealth: Australians and
the Allied Intelligence Bureau 1942-1945 (Carlton: Melbourne University
Press, 1996), p.279.
- For details of SEMUT operations prior to OBOE
6, see Memorandum on S.R.D. Operations in British Borneo, February
June, 1945, Appendix B: Operational Report SEMUT I to 10 Jun
[19]45, undated, NAA A3269/12 A28/B. Several SEMUT members
had also recorded their actions. For SEMUT 1, see the handwritten
notes by Sergeant C. F. Sanderson (AWM PR 83/242). Major Tom Harrisson
has published his account, World within: a Borneo story (London:
Cresset Press, 1959). Sergeant Bob C. Long, on the other hand, has
compiled the experiences of several SEMUT 1 members and produced a
single-volume work, Operation Semut 1: "Z" Special Unit’s
secret war; soldiering with the head-hunters of Borneo (Maryborough,
Victoria: Australian Print Group, 1989). For the exploits and achievements
of SEMUT 2, see the handwritten account by Sergeant K. W. Hallam (AWM
PR 84/247).
- Harrisson, World within, p.342.
- Judith M. Heimann, The most offending soul
alive. Tom Harrisson and his remarkable life (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1997, 1998), p.193.
- Harrisson, World within, p.342.
- Powell, War by stealth, p.301.
- For the detailed list of specific tasks requested
of STALLION by the 9th Division, see Wootten to 1st Corps, 25 April
1945, "Subject: SRD Requirements OBOE Six".
- "Ref. Accuracy of infm from field sources
particularly native reports", Major K. F. Mollard, SRD, SF Detachment
in the Field, Group A, Morotai, 15 June [19]45, NAA A3269/12-A27/A.
- SOA Operational Summary, June 1945, PRO, HS1/245.
- "Ref. Accuracy of infm from field sources
particularly native reports".
- See SOA Operational Summary, June 1945.
- "Ref. Accuracy of infm from field sources
particularly native reports".
- It was admitted that "Rumours are so prevalent
in the East and particularly in Malay-speaking countries, that they
are seldom acted upon." Memorandum on SRD Operation[s] in British
Borneo, [July 1945], PRO, HS1/246.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- "Summary of SRD Operations in support of
OBOE VI, 9 Aust Div, Brunei", prepared by G Branch, SRD Headquarters,
Melbourne, 1 October 1945, Addendum, PRO, HS1/2S1.
- Numerous books deal with the "Sandakan Death
March", among them: Don Wall, Sandakan under Nippon: the last
march (Sydney: D. Wall, 1988) and Abandoned: Australians at
Sandakan (Sydney: D. Wall, 1990); Athol Moffitt, Project KINGFISHER
(Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1989); and Lynette Ramsay Silver,
Sandakan: a conspiracy of silence (Bowral, N.S.W.: Sally Milner
Publishing, 2000).
- A chronology of the "Sandakan Death March"
is offered in Silver, Sandakan, pp.318-321.
- Memorandum on S.R.D. Operations in British Borneo
February-June, 1945, Appendix A: "Preliminary Operational Report
of Party AGAS covering period from 24 Feb to 31 May [19]45",
29 May 1945, p.1, NAA A3269/12-A28/B.
- Ibid., p.4.
- Ibid., p.6.
- For details of KINGFISHER, see Moffitt, Kingfisher,
pp.225-290.
- Quoted in Silver, Sandakan, p.302. See
also Moffitt, Kingfisher, pp.232-234.
- See Silver, Sandakan, p.301-12.
- Ibid., p.307.
- A "storpedo" was a metre-long cardboard
cylinder capable of carrying about 113 kg of supplies which was air
dropped using a hessian parachute.
- Silver, Sandakan, p.303.
- Quoted in Moffitt, Kingfisher, p.238.
- Quoted in Silver, Sandakan, p.310.
- Moffitt, Kingfisher, p.237.
- Quoted in Silver, Sandakan, p.303.
- Jack Sue did end up writing his memoirs, published
as Blood on Borneo (Perth: WA Skindivers Publication, c.2001).
In this book, he supports (pp.383-5) Chester's contention that the
Americans were "never ever short of Dakotas and landing barges",
and questions whether Blamey was "genuinely interested in Operation
'Kingfisher' and getting the POW out of Sandakan".
- Quoted in Silver, Sandakan, p.312.
- Powell, War by stealth, p.282.
- Foreword in Wall, Abandoned.
- Powell, War by stealth, p.283.
- See Wall, Abandoned, passim.
- Powell, War by stealth, p.282.
- See "SRD and BBCAU", Lieutenant General
F. H. Berryman, Chief of Staff, Advanced Land Headquarters, South-West
Pacific Area, 21 June [19]45. (C. F. C. Macaskie Papers, MSS Pac.S.71,
Rhodes House Library, RHL).
- Ibid. Officers to be seconded to SRD were those
already acquainted with particular districts, and also those who intended
to be District Officers of the said areas where SRD were operating.